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Abstract
The international community proclaims victory when a conflict-ridden state is able to
get rid of the main cause of the conflict. However, all the problems of the state do not end
with that victory. It rather triggers a whole new set of problems, which combined with the
aftermath of the conflict, leads the country to a larger crisis. Afghanistan, after the fall of
Taliban regime in 2001, faced various social, political and economic challenges that marked
the beginning of a transition period that was much more challenging than the previous period.
In this paper, I discuss the major problems of transition-period Afghanistan and how the
handling of these problems has shaped the image of the government inside the country and
outside. I look into various variables that have played leading roles in Afghanistan in the past
ten years (legitimacy, corruption, and state capacity), analyze their interconnectedness, and
examine the state‘s vulnerability, leading to a discussion of whether there is an immediate
need for a changed approach by national leadership. I demonstrate the complex interaction of
the variables in connection with their impact on economic development. Towards the end, I
suggest the need for a balanced approach, including but not limited to the increase in subnational capacity, which will involve strong leadership from the government to define and
divide the functions of various actors involved in the stabilization of the country. We will see
that Afghanistan‘s geographical location, its natural capacity and the international support it
has been receiving provide it with immense prospect for stabilization and even development,
providing that the variables analyzed in the paper are addressed.

Key Words: Afghanistan, transition period, legitimacy, corruption, capacity
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I. Introduction
States are always evolving—they are always in a transition of some sort. Transition
processes carry a set of challenges and opportunities for a state. In a highly interconnected
world, like the one we have today, the transition process in one state involves many actors
within and outside that particular state. In this paper, we analyze the transition in political and
economic capabilities in a post-conflict transition-period Afghanistan.
Afghanistan has been experiencing a profound transition since the events of
September 2001. The Taliban government was toppled by a U.S. led coalition force and since
then the state has gone through various political changes. Daily activities in Afghanistan have
been endangered due to violent combat between the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) and Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. With millions of dollars flowing into the country
as foreign aid, people‘s expectations have risen. But the limited capacity of and effort from a
weak and vulnerable political system, have taken the country not much further since the
transition began. Security is still a big problem and development a far-away goal.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the transition of Afghanistan since 2001, using
the transition literature as a conceptual starting point. The transition literature indicates that
the Afghan transition has been a complex interplay of various actors—government,
communities, insurgents, NGOs and international communities. The interplay helps us dissect
the transition period and outline the major problems it posed to the stabilization of
Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, we will examine its transition process in terms of our
larger understanding of transition processes, focusing on the role of variables that include:
legitimacy, corruption, state and sub-national capacity, and their complex interplay. Towards

6

the end, I will follow this analysis with an examination of the impact of the transition process
on Afghanistan‘s economic development prospects.
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II. The Theoretical and Regional Context
A. What is a transition period?
According to UNDP, transition periods are defined ―broadly as periods of
multidimensional economic, political and/or societal change arising from a transfer of power
or a period of conflict.‖1 The importance of a transition lies on the challenges that it poses to
the effective running of a political system. Transition raises concerns over political authority,
economic development, human rights, security, basic living infrastructures—food, clothing
and shelter—and many more complex elements that create the backbone of a stable state.
Sometimes, transition also threatens the statehood of the state by tampering with its
legitimacy within the state and outside. Transition period is also a period for a state to reassess
its political capacity and to create measures to develop it. A state goes through big changes in
political leadership during a transition period, making it difficult for the new leadership to
deal with security issues and develop state capacity at the same time. Also, while trying to
stabilize the political situation of the state, governments ignore many social and economic
issues, leading to the accumulation of complex problems, which in the course of time, cripple
the state from all sides.
The literature helps us identify some of the important variables that create the complex
foundation of Afghanistan‘s transition period. The most notable fact is that, although scholars
identify one variable to be a little more important than the other, none of them disregard their
interconnectedness. In fact, in analyzing this literature, one can argue that stabilization and

1

United Nations Development Programme, Capacity Development Group, edited by Kann Wignaraja,
―Capacity Development During Periods of Transition,‖ 2007, pg. 2.
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development are almost impossible if any one of these variables is disregarded. Important
variables include:
1. Legitimacy
Trust between people and the government is a very important tool for a country‘s
progress. The US military occupation in 2001 was successful partly because of the support by
Afghan people who desperately wanted to free themselves from Taliban shackles. Their
welcoming of the international community also reflected their rejection of failed political
leaders and movements of the past.2 The most important characteristic of a democratic
government is that it should have the support of its people. Bhatia cites the definition of
legitimacy as ―the capacity of a social or political system to develop and maintain a general
belief that the existing social order is generally appropriate.‖3
2. Corruption
Transparency International defines corruption as ―the abuse of entrusted power for
private gain.‖4 Corruption is a typical phenomenon in a developing state where people place
family or ethnical ties over social or national responsibility. Corruption is possible only when
at least one individual is in a powerful position. Since administrative positions have such
powers, they are very susceptible to corruption in developing countries, due to the lack of
regulatory mechanisms and effectiveness of the ‗rule of law.‘ Kurer uses various traditional
definitions of corruption to devise a newer version based on what he calls ‗impartiality
principle,‘ where he defines corruption as a violation of non-discrimination norms by a holder

Thomas J. Barfield, ―Problems in Starting Legitimacy in Afghanistan,‖ Iranian Studies 3, no. 2 (2004):
290, doi: 10.1080/0021086042000268100.
3
Michael Bhatia, ―The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn
Afghanistan,‖ International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (2007): 93, doi: 10.1080/13533310601114301.
4
Transparency International. News Room, ―Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption,‖
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq.
2
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of public ofﬁce in order to gain a private advantage.5 Since the idea of impartiality or nondiscrimination here suggests that every citizen deserves the right to be served equally, the
question of corruption finds itself in a very significant position when we describe the
interrelation of a government with its people.
3. Capacity
Capacity of the state is its ability to function. Understanding capacity is simple; for
example, if terrorist activities are increasing in a state, then one can conclude that the state‘s
capacity to counter these activities is low or diminishing. The issue then is the necessity for
the state to develop its counterinsurgency efforts—that is, to develop its counterinsurgency
capacity. Similarly if the foreign aid that comes to the country is not being put into best use to
generate maximum output then it suggests that there is a lack of capacity to utilize foreign aid.
To develop this capacity the government strengthens its institutions and policies that deal with
foreign aid so that maximum yield is guaranteed.
B. What is the historical context of Af gh an istan’s tran sition p eriod ?
Afghanistan stands out when the terms conflict and transition are mentioned. People
believe that amidst the inaccessible mountains, there has always been a religious and political
tug-of-war. However, it is unknown to many people that at one time this same country served
as ‗a buffer-state‘ and was thought of as the ‗Switzerland of Asia.‘6 Afghanistan was a
relatively peaceful state until the Soviet occupation of the country in 1978.
Over time many dynasties ruled Afghanistan. They did so, however, without
strengthening the country‘s political and economic independence. This history made the
Oscar Kurer, ―Corruption: An Alternative Approach to Its Definition and Measurement,‖ Political Studies
53, no. 1 (2005): 223, Academic Search Complete, EBSCO host.
6
William Maley, ―Afghanistan: an historical and geographical appraisal,‖ International Review of the Red
Cross 9, no. 880 (2010): 860, doi: 10.1017/S1816383111000154 859.
5
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country highly centralized, weak and ultimately susceptible to the expansionism of the Soviet
Union. The core of Soviet interest lay not just on the expansion of communism or on a race
with the United States, but on threats that the large Muslim population of an unstable
Afghanistan posed in spreading and influencing rebellion to neighboring Soviet Central Asia.7
The Soviet regime in Afghanistan lasted for almost a decade starting in 1978 and created the
platform for numerous conflicts that followed.
The mujahedeen (followers of jihad)8 rose to combat Soviet forces and were aided
greatly by the United States because of their common anti-communist ideals. However, in the
course of time, especially after victory over the Soviets, the mujahedeen had an internal
conflict leading to the formation of a pro-Pakistan Taliban group.9 The Taliban were a Sunni
political-religious organization of mainly ethnic Pashtuns, separated from the mujahedeen,
who sought to impose a conservative version of sharia, or Islamic law, throughout
Afghanistan.10 When the rest of the world was emphasizing the need for freedom and
equality, Afghan society faced all variety of Taliban-inspired assaults on human rights.
Women were banned from going to schools, homosexuality became a sin, and drug
cultivation reached its apex.11 The combination of a deplorable human-rights record and a
growing allegiance to the terrorist group Al-Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden led
Taliban government to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.
For the purpose of this paper, all these periods of conflict and instability do not fall
under the transition-period Afghanistan that we wish to focus on. In fact they create a

Paul Dibb, ―The Soviet experience in Afghanistan: lessons to be learned,‖ Australian Journal of
International Affairs 64, no. 5 ( 2010): 504, doi: 10.1080/10357718.2010.513366.
8
Maley, ―Appraisal,‖ 866.
9
Ibid., 869.
10
Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Press, 2012), 14.
11
Ibid., 15.
7
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foundation for the transition period that began in 2001. On September 9, 2001, Al Qaeda
assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, an anti-Taliban leader and two days later, they launched a
series of attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States.12 This day
stands out in history for two reasons: thousands of innocent lives were lost, and a devastating
war began. The war was named ―War on Terror‖13 and the United States took a leading role in
avenging the lives of its citizens that died during the attacks, in eliminating terrorist
organizations around the world, and in dismantling the governments that ―sponsor, shelter and
supply terrorists.‖14 American intelligence agencies had gathered a sufficient amount of
evidence on Al Qaeda‘s bases being located in Afghanistan and of the Taliban‘s support for
this organization. As a result, President Bush gave an ultimatum to the Taliban government
with the following demands:
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your
land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly
imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country.
Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan,
and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to
appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training
camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not
open to negotiation or discussion.15
The failure of the Taliban government to comply with the United States‘ demands
resulted in ―Operation Enduring Freedom‖ on October 7, 2001.16 Although this was the
beginning of another foreign military occupation in Afghanistan, it was different in many
ways from the earlier Soviet incursion. Firstly, it was a multi-national operation, including
countries such as United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and others assisting the American
Maley, ―Appraisal,‖ 871.
George W. Bush, ―State of the Union Address to the Nation,‖ White House Press Release, Washington
D.C., January 29, 2002.
14
George W. Bush, ―Address to the Nation,‖ White House Press Release, Washington D.C., September 20,
2001.
15
Bush, ―Address to the Nation.‖
16
Lansford, ―9/11,‖ 210.
12
13

12

soldiers. Secondly, the operation was not to invade Afghanistan but to restore democracy and
peace in the nation by making it easy for those political parties, who abide by the Western
democratic principles and commit against terrorism, to rule the country. The United States
and the coalition forces succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban from Kabul on November 13,
2001 and won over Kandahar on December 9, 2001 marking the end of Taliban regime.17 In a
sense, the war was over; but in the aftermath of the war, the real challenge emerged.
Afghanistan was in a period of change, which we now can connect to the idea
of transition discussed earlier. Afghan people had seen large numbers of American soldiers
march on their territory exclaiming the end of the Taliban regime but they had not yet seen the
unveiling of women, remuneration of their lost property or rise in their living standard. The
war created many angry groups of people, in Afghanistan and outside. Although it seemed
like it started in an attempt to avenge the 9/11 attacks, theorists, social scientists, analysts,
media, and people from all sectors gave varying interpretations on the implications of the war.
The United States had seen ―in Afghanistan, al Qaeda‘s vision of the world‖18 but that reason
wasn‘t sufficient for its elongated stay in the region. The U.S. defined its stay in Afghanistan
as an effective means for empowering counter-terrorism activities in the region and supported
this by initiating counter-terrorism activities in other states like Philippines, Bosnia and Iraq.19
In order to identify the political challenges of the transition period in Afghanistan and to
create measures to minimize the adverse effects of the war, international community
convened in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 for the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. The
Bonn Agreement established an interim authority called Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA)

17

Ibid., 211.
Bush, ―Address to the Nation.‖
19
Bush, ―Union.‖
18
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under Hamid Karzai to govern Afghanistan for a period of 6 months.20 In June 2002, Hamid
Karzai was elected as the interim head of the state by the Loya Jirga.21 However, Afghanistan
faced a big crisis of securing its political legitimacy in the world. It took 3 years for an
election to happen. The new Karzai-government had the responsibility of not just bringing all
the unsatisfied factions together but also in creating opportunities for long-term sustainable
development. None of these happened as expected, as the country became more confounded
by its day-to-day social, political and economic crises.

Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, ―A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road
Ahead in Afghanistan,‖ Institute for National Strategic Studies: Strategic Perspectives 8, (Washington, D.C.:
NDU Press, 2011), 5.
21
BBC News, ―Afghanistan Profile,‖ South Asia, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12024253.
20
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III. Analysis of Variables and Implications for Afghanistan
The first thing that one needs to know about Afghanistan‘s political ability is that
Afghanistan had mostly been a ‗rentier state‘ whose central governments had always been
dependent on extracting outside resources in order to maintain their stability.22 A rentier state
is a state whose one sector accounts for the overwhelming proportion of its gross national
product, with a minor contribution from domestic investment.23 In the case of Afghanistan,
this one sector has been foreign aid. So when we measure the current government‘s abilities,
we need to keep in mind that the government is a dependent actor.
The source of that dependence is the International Community. Afghanistan is one of
the poorest countries in the world and fairly insecure, considering that it had been a safe
haven for many terrorist organizations in the past. A very important question today is: what is
the goal of international community when it comes to Afghanistan? Carl Robichaud mentions
that success in Afghanistan is based on the minimum condition that the Afghan state can
constrain the threat of violent jihadism within its borders and contain any threats to the
international order.24 For this to happen, a functioning state with popular support is deemed a
must.25 The concern is that although the international community might be able to provide
monetary and military support, it lies in the hands of Afghan leadership to gain popular
support and authenticate its legitimacy. Afghanistan is a relatively safer place than it was in
Barfield, ―Starting Legitimacy,‖ 286.
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, ―The Rentier State,‖ British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 16,
no. 2 (1989): pp. 195. http://www.jstor.org/stable/195155; Lisa Anderson, ―Policy-Making and Theory Building:
Ame rican Political Science and the Islamic Middle East,‖ in Hisham Sharabi (ed.), Theory, Politics and The
Arab World: Critical Responses (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 61, cited by Ahmet Kuru, "The Rentier State
Model and Central Asian Studies: The Turkmen Case," Alternatives: Turkish Journal Of International
Relations 1, no. 1 (2002): 52; the basic definition of a ‗rentier state‘ is ‗a state reliant not on extraction of the
domestic population‘s surplus production but on externally generated revenues, or rents, such as those derived
from oil.
24
Carl Robichaud, ―Buying Time in Afghanistan,‖ World Policy Journal (Summer 2007): 2, doi:
10.1162/wopj.2007.24.2.1.
25
Ibid.
22
23
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2001, however the increase in Taliban offensive activities since 2006 and their assumed rise
to power after the expected military withdrawal by the U.S. by 2014 show that the tides are
shifting and that the international effort in Afghanistan might be a mere repeat of the Soviet
debacle.26
A. Establishing legitimacy
Establishing legitimacy is an ongoing struggle for the Afghan state. The factors that
question the legitimacy of the current government include: its incompetence to manage and
rebuild corrupt government institutions, its inability to install competent local governance, its
failure to spend Western aid effectively, and its incapability of avoiding favoritism with
respect to the fellow Durrani tribesman.27
One of the failures of the current government has been its inability to hunt down and
bring justice to brutal mujahedeen warlords. For example, Christian Parenti mentions that the
jangsalarans—who are seen as thieves and murderers— ―are being folded into government
and given new power and legitimacy by the UN and the U.S. backed government of Hamid
Karzai.‖28 The same thieves and murderers are portrayed as the key players to the
development of the state, further infuriating the local public and dismantling their belief in the
government. Parenti also blames the international community for supporting the inclusion of
these mujahedeen leaders and for turning Afghanistan in a narco-mafia state. 29 He relies on
interviews with local people who express their frustration on ―why America has given these

26

Ibid., 2, 3.
Robert McMahon, ―Legitimacy Questions in Afghanistan,‖ Council on Foreign Relations, November 2,
2009, 1, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/legitimacy-questions-afghanistan/p20584.
28
Christian Parenti, ―Who Rules Afghanistan,‖ The Nation, November 15, 2004, pg. 13.
29
Ibid., 13, 14.
27
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commanders a position in the government.‖30 This rise in impunity shows that the current
government is trying, by joining with the evil forces of the society, to prevent accountability
for past crimes.31
Bhatia examines the proposal of mujahedeen‘s ‗right to rule‘ by analyzing what roles
and images they carry.32 He mentions that the mujahedeen are not seen as a similar entity as
during the war against the Soviets.33 Today, when some mujahedeen ally themselves with the
government, others join the Taliban and fight against the coalition forces. Still others exercise
their power at the local level, often capturing the attention of NGOs and human rights
activists.34 Not only do they constitute varying factions, often in conflict with each other, but
the mujahedeen muddle the legitimacy of the central government. To recognize them as a
legitimate force means to give back the painstakingly achieved steering wheel of
Afghanistan‘s cart back to the ‗socially perceived evil forces‘, while to denounce them means
to put a stop sign in the peace process by dissatisfying the powerful and violent actors of
Afghan society.
Legitimacy is at peril in Afghanistan also because of the government‘s inability to
expand its influence outside Kabul. Before Karzai was reelected the President of Afghanistan
in 2004, the new constitution of Afghanistan came into effect.35 This new constitution
established a strong presidential system,36 as a result centralizing the power in Kabul, in the
process disabling the government‘s ability to tie the Taliban-controlled rural areas together.
Karzai‘s government‘s inability to mediate with the Taliban leaders has divided the country
30

Ibid., 18.
Robichaud, ―Buying Time,‖ 3.
32
Bhatia, ―Future,‖ 104.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Lansford, ―9/11,‖ 219.
36
Maley, ―appraisal,‖ 872.
31
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into factions and the government faces a very difficult task of influencing people to take their
side. In a poor country like Afghanistan where people‘s ways of lives are dictated by old
traditional norms of local governance and strict Islamic values, the effectiveness of a
centralized government in reaching out for all its people is low. Paretti writes: ―. . . out here in
the desert and mountains there is no democracy, no nation building, no NGOs, no American
patrols…. Now the only sign of something like state power is a local commander‘s young
gunman with a bayonet on his AK-47.‖37 Afghanistan has failed to establish a centralized
government that can reach out and control the rest of the country. For a rentier state, a
centralized government is very important in order to serve as a legitimate middleman between
foreign aid and development projects.
It is important for the government to expand its influence to every corner of the state
to effectively distribute these funds and implement projects, but this process may be
problematic. The idea of subnational governance sounds like a reasonable alternative in the
case of Afghanistan, but will the Karzai government be able to allow local authorities to take
the charge in their hands is the biggest question. This might not only make Kabul weak, but
might also allow anti-Karzai leaders that are influential in their community to emerge as
leaders of their towns and villages. The Karzai government fears that the influential local
strongmen will position themselves in such a way that their bargaining power increases
relative to the central government.38 However, the inability to be decentralized can create a
big crowd of unsatisfied civilians, who feeling vulnerable after years of violence, can join
rebellions.

Parenti, ―Rules,― 18.
Armando Geller et al., ―State Capacity and Conflict: Evidence from Afghanistan‖ Computational Social
Science Society of America Annual Conference, Oct 9-12, 2011, Santa Fe, New Mexico. 4.
37
38
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Elections are important to the change process during the transition period of a country.
A country‘s government gets authentication in the eyes of the local and international
community only through a fair victory in an election. Elections are also a backbone of a
democratic system and an important measure to understand public opinion. Afghanistan
doesn‘t have a good reputation when it comes to elections and this has made the government
appear untrustworthy. The 2009 election gained its notoriety for being fraudulent.39 After the
withdrawal of the chief opponent to Karzai in the presidential election in 2009, more questions
have been raised from the international community on the legitimacy of the current
government. Abdullah Abdullah withdrew his presidential candidacy claiming that the
elections had been rigged, and when Hamid Karzai took over the presidency he did so amidst
criticism from all over the world.40 The Taliban also got an opportunity to point fingers at the
government and the international community, especially at the U.S. and the U.K., who despite
the knowledge of the fraudulent votes, sent congratulations to Karzai.41
Bhatia mentions that the government uses the national security forces to establish a
‗monopoly of legitimate force.‘42 Afghan National Army (ANA) has worked diligently in
collaboration with the coalition forces in order to fight insurgencies and terrorism in the
region. It has also been pivotal in reconstruction efforts. Scholars believe that the military
forces in Afghanistan not only have the burden of following orders from higher officials but
also of tying the ethnically fragmented Afghan society together and creating a sense of
national identity.43 Simonsen enlists the two main sources of legitimacy for a new national
International Crisis Group, ―Afghanistan Conflict History,‖ January 2010,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/afghanistan.aspx.
40
NewStatesman , Leader , ―Killed in the Name of Crooked Karzai,‖ November 9, 2009, 7.
41
NewStatesman , ―Crooked Karzai,‖ 7.
42
Bhatia, ―Future,‖ 104.
43
Sven Gunnar Simonsen, ―Leaving Security in Safe Hands: Identity, Legitimacy and Cohesion in the New
Afghan and Iraqi Armies,‖ Third World Quarterly 30, no. 8 (2009): 1490, doi: 10.1080/01436590903321851.
39
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army as composition and mission.44 Since the soldiers in ANA are a mix of Uzbeks, Tajiks,
Pashtuns, and many more tribes, the heterogeneity can create an environment of social
tolerance and strengthen the backbone of Afghan society. However, scholars also fear that this
composition can have short-term side effects such as the issue of cohesion in the individual
unit.45 The United States—culturally different and not always positively perceived—has taken
charge of most military operations in Afghanistan. This, on one hand, might give the Afghan
national military legitimacy in the eyes of the international community but, on the other hand,
might pose the threat of detaching them from their local, ethnic links and weakening their
social legitimacy. Simonsen fears that the society can broadly reject the state‘s political and
military agenda if it perceives the political leadership as representing foreign interests.46 The
military culture of a country is also based on its value as a money-generating service. When
the monetary value of joining the security forces outweighs its emotional/moral value, the
respect for the position declines and so does the legitimacy of the force and of the government
that it represents.

B. Corruption
The cancer of corruption is metastatic in Afghanistan. It will lead to a terminal
condition, unless chemotherapy to reduce the chance of further infection
(preventive measures) is combined with surgery to remove the biggest infected
nodules (the key villains)47
Corruption has been one of the biggest problems of transition-period Afghanistan.
Corruption is an important issue during any transitional period since leaders are not secure
about the duration of their stay in ministerial positions. This will motivate them to indulge in
44

Ibid., 1484.
Ibid., 1494.
46
Ibid., 1492.
47
―Afghanistan‘s ‗cancer of corruption‘.‖ Canadian Medical Association Journal 182(4) (2010):
http://www.cmaj.ca.
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nepotism and the misuse of foreign aid for their personal benefits. They will exhaust all the
funds while they are in those positions. The main concern, however, is that corruption has
surged significantly during the transition period. Transparency International‘s Corruption
Perception Index 2011 places Afghanistan at a rank of 180 with a score of 1.5, as the fourth
most corrupt country in the world.48 The index ranks countries according to their perceived
levels of public-sector corruption including, but not limited to, bribery of public officials,
kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, et cetera.49 The range of
corruption in Afghanistan expands from small bribes while issuing a license to the misuse of
funds from international donors.
Corruption in developing countries is not a new thing; however, what makes it special in
the case of Afghanistan is its exponential rise since 2001. The low capacity of political
institutions and the great influx of foreign aid during the war have been the root causes for
corruption, not to mention that the social culture and the drug industry have been equally
important forces for its cause. What makes corruption even more serious is its prevalence in
government institutions that deal with providing services to the public directly. This not only
hinders democratic governance but also adds to the legitimacy problem discussed earlier.
Corruption comes as an accessory to the pre-existing drug-based economy in
Afghanistan. Drug dealers influence and bribe political leaders and law enforcement officers
in order to secure their trade. The more the government fails to effectively utilize international
funds to cut down on national drug businesses, the more it loses its trust in the international
community. The interrelation between the drug industry in Afghanistan and the state of
corruption in the country is astounding. Goodhand blames the drug economy for being the
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vehicle for accumulating power since political entrepreneurs seeking legitimacy have ―remote
control‖ engagement with the drug trade where they work through connections lower down
the chain.50 The involvement of government officials in drug economy stains the legitimacy
of the government and undermines all the other activities they carry out. For example the
Ministry of Interior (MoI), one of the most corrupt ministries, is seen as a ‗shop for selling
[law enforcement] jobs,‘ particularly in areas that involve drug-control.51
The UNDP‘s Report on Corruption in Post-Conflict and Recovery Situations-2010
provides important information on the status of corruption in Afghanistan, particularly as
connected with the drug industry. The opium industry‘s influence matched with the
ineffectiveness of the current government is described in the UNDP report as a major cause of
corruption in transition-period Afghanistan. The report states: ―Under the pre-2001 Taliban
regime, the prevalence of corruption is reported to have been low. This has been attributed to
that regime‘s high-profile punishment of petty corruption and the limited opportunities for
corruption at that time due to small resource flows and to the de facto quasi-legal status of the
opium economy.‖52 The UN‘s 2007 World Drug Report shows that opium production in
Afghanistan has risen frighteningly.53 The opium industry has served both the farmers and
government officials greatly in Afghanistan. The UNDP report mentions that about one-third
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of the country‘s GDP is opium-based54, showing the government‘s incompetence in counternarcotic programs. In fact, counter-narcotic programs have created more opportunities for
corruption by providing the concerned officials with leverage to bargain with drug dealers for
their share. Drug dealers have also had an impact on the police force by bribing the antinarcotic officers to help with their trade. If the agency established to fight a problem instead
becomes an agency that fosters it, then the magnitude of the problem is sure to surge
exponentially. Corrupt government agencies have used their power and resources to crumble
the nation than to empower it. The laissez-faire policy of the coalition forces towards drug, in
order not to infuriate the local allies who were involved in this business, also contributed to
the rise in opium production.55
However, the drug industry is only one aspect of corruption in Afghanistan. The
involvement of public service providers in corruption reaches far beyond opium and
marijuana. An article by the Canadian Medical Association Journal shows the paws of
corruption have extended to the health industry, one of the most sensitive and vulnerable
public sectors. It places doctors and nurses on the fifth and seventh position respectively on
the list of people who typically demand incentives for their services, including ―better
treatment.‖56 Corruption is like a chain reaction—one leading to another. Reuters mentions
that senior officers and Interior Ministry officials take a cut of policemen salaries, who then
exact bribes from the populace to make up their pay. 57 This angers the people but at the same
time influences them to join government services too so that they can benefit in the same way.
As a result, both the political and social culture of the state becomes corrupt.
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The extensive involvement of law enforcement officials, ranging from police officers to
judges and prosecutors, in corruption is the most important threat to state legitimacy and
development. People facing corruption in their everyday life is one thing, but not to be able to
report these corruptions to the necessary law enforcement officials or courts is another. U.S.
General Robert Cone, commander of the force that trains the Afghan army and police
asserted, ―the final point is corruption, corruption, corruption; it is endemic‖ in an interview
with the Reuters.58 The justice system is also a dysfunctional unit with incompetent judges
and inadequate resources; and added to this is the frequent interference by government
officials and militia commanders.59 Corruption in the judicial system not only halts the flow
of service transfer and impacts good governance, but also messes up the checks and balances
system of the country. In the shadow of a corrupt judicial system, the legislative and the
executive bodies of the state exercise limitless power. This reduces the transparency and the
accountability of the government, making it an unreliable actor in the development and
rebuilding process.
Corruption in Afghanistan doesn‘t only have internal roots. Foreign aid that comes into
the country to assist with development and reconstruction efforts has become a major source
of corruption in Afghanistan. The UNDP report blames ―large inflows of international
assistance combined with the pressure to spend these funds quickly‖ as one of the three major
causes of corruption in Afghanistan besides the opium industry and the failure of political
institutions.60 The inflow was tremendous right after the fall of Taliban regime in 2001. There
had not been a lot of research on the political, social, and cultural complexities of Afghanistan
and thus international aid that entered the country had neither a well-planned goal (types of
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projects) nor an effective medium (government and local agencies) to put the funds into longterm, sustainable use. So, most of the money ended up in the pockets of government officials.
President Karzai himself has acknowledged that ―there is corruption regarding international
aid" and that it has complemented the corruption in his administration.61 Etzioni states that
foreign aid can sometimes become ―a poisoned gift‖ promoting dependency on foreign states
and disproportionately benefitting a certain group of people in the host country and providing
more resources for corrupt agencies to exploit.62 From the perspective of the corrupt officials,
foreign aid corruption is also a much easier and safer form of corruption than other forms of
petty corruption and bribery. This is because the local population is generally unaware of the
amount of foreign aid that enters the country or about its handling. So the officials don‘t find
themselves accountable to the public. However, in the long run, when proposed and promised
development projects get stalled at one point, people apparently know that there has been
corruption in the higher level. To counter this form of corruption, international NGOs have
recently started to deal directly with local agencies and provide them with aid rather than
work through the central government. This clearly marks the failing legitimacy of the
government in the eyes of the people and the international community.
One of the indirect and unforeseen impacts of corruption is its shaping of a country‘s
social culture. The purpose of the international community in Afghanistan is not just to make
it a secure state but also to empower it in the long-term so that it becomes self-sustainable.
For this, the local population, and more importantly the future generation, has to be taken care
of. Corruption works exactly against this purpose by slowly engraving a selfish culture in the
minds of the future generation, who see corruption as an indispensable part of their lives.
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They base their actions and objectives on the foundation of corruption and grow up to become
corrupt citizens. A villager‘s son, who sees his father pay bribes every day, grows up seeing
corruption as a means to get work done. So, when he grows up to lead the nation or to work
for the government, his childhood learning finds a laboratory, in his job, where he uses
corruption as a tool to succeed and move up the ladder. This is a long-term social problem for
Afghanistan and a retrogressive step for development since the potential manpower of the
country is developing ideals based upon corruption.

C. Lack of capacity
In the case of transition-period Afghanistan, one of the biggest setbacks has been its lack
of capacity to ensure efficient delivery of services in several areas including health care,
education, state building, public administration, justice, security, aid utilization, human rights,
gender equality, and many more. However, in this paper, we are not describing these specific
areas. We rather see the capacity of the state and of the community from a broad perspective
and analyze how its relative absence has affected all these different areas and the state as a
whole.
Riphenburg emphasizes the role of political capacity of the country as a driving force for
economic progress and identifies three main capacities—extractive capability, institutional
credibility and transparency—that combine to form the total political capacity.63 Extractive
capability deals with the capacity of the government to extract taxes from people.64 The
majority of Afghan population is involved in agriculture; and due to high levels of poverty in
the country, tax generation is neither a big source of income nor a priority. Local warlords‘
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involvement in local governance and their value in aiding the security efforts of the national
government also make it difficult to tax them. Transparency deals with the opening of Afghan
society to the world through means of media, internet, and news sharing. Its significance in
educating people in political and economic issues is unavoidable, and its political impact was
also evident during the Arab Spring, where internet and communication technologies were
pivotal in the revolutionary movement. However, in the case of Afghanistan, the most
important capacity issue lies in institutional credibility.
Institutional credibility is a major factor for legitimizing the government and its activities.
Ripenburg defines institutional credibility as the accountability necessary to attract private
capital.65 This has been an area where the government has been lagging behind during the
transition period and has been thoroughly criticized by the local people and the international
community. The capacity of government institutions to oversee and enforce policies is lacking
at all levels as a result of highly centralized administrative arrangements, lack of skilled
professionals, gender imbalance, low pay and a lack of merit-based recruitment.66
Corruption in the government has also contributed to the lack of capacity to implement
policies and, especially, to utilize foreign aid. We have already mentioned in the previous
sections the dreadful impacts of corruption in Afghan societies. Corruption and state capacity
are linked very closely together. One report mentions how the relative absence of two types
of capacity has contributed to corruption:



Absence of legal and regulatory systems and efficient enforcement, as well as
absence of institutional structures that encourage accountability, transparency
and information sharing
Low level of salaries in the public sector and delays in payment67
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The lack of institutional capacity in Afghanistan comes from the enormity of the task
that the government has to face and the overlapping functions between Ministries, Central
Government and local governments.68 Public administration is at jeopardy and can crash
anytime if efforts are not made towards its reformation. The influx of foreign aid adds to the
misery since incompetent and perplexed departments are provided with an amount of money,
which they don‘t have the capacity to utilize. To help in this endeavor, donor communities
have, at several times, sought to build up the implementation capacity of the bureaucracy
through provision of training.69 However, the state hasn‘t been able to follow up on these
measures and thus many departments lack trained and educated manpower.
One of the other problems is that many departments within the government were formed
in the recent years in order to better fulfill the changing needs of a developing Afghanistan.
Such departments address short term needs and are focused to aid-specific national and
international projects. A lot of money flows in to support these departments; however, even
after the completion of the work, they keep staying on the budget agenda like other
departments and waste money on non-functioning employees. A report calls them ―ghost
employees‖, since they are listed on the payrolls of Ministries but actually don‘t work. 70
However the government version of the story should not be completely disregarded. The
government argues that the international agencies hold most of the funds, information and
analysis, thus making it difficult for the government to implement policies and allocate funds
at its will.71 On the basis of these premises, the government has sought to contract out the

68

Ibid., 17.
Peter Marsden, ―Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process,‖ International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1944- ) 79, no. 1 (January 2003): 94, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3095543.
70
UNS, ―Common Country,‖ 17.
71
Marsden, ―Reconstruction,‖ 95.
69

28

implementation process to private sector, the UN and NGOs rather than building up its own
implementation capacity.72
Nepotism is another important cause for the declining capacity of the state. Just like
corruption, nepotism has been embedded in Afghani culture, society and political behavior for
some time. Afghanistan has a weak civil society centered on family, tribe and community,
with a minimum number of opportunities for women. Due to the lack of female participation
in political discourse, the local community is missing out on a huge chunk of population that
could complement its voice against unaccountable government policies. And due to the tribecentered nature of the community, favoritism has overcome merit-based recruitment. The
tendency of many international agencies that operate in Afghanistan to hire employees from
their home country has only exacerbated the unemployment problem of Afghanistan. Since
foreigners are taking employment opportunities from local Afghans and depleting the
resources assigned to Afghanistan, the Afghani people are losing their faith both in the
government and in the international community. Politicization of the public administration
institutions and absence of a merit-based system, a major characteristic of Afghani political
and social structure, have been cited as the underlying causes for the lack of institutional
capacity.73
1. Centralized vs. Decentralized Governance:
The discussion on capacity leads us to analyze whether a centralized state is
beneficial in the case of Afghanistan or not. Our study and discussion of legitimacy,
corruption and capacity helps us underline some of the advantages and disadvantages of a
centralized Afghan state. The advantages are:
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A centralized government unifies the various tribes and ethnic communities under
one flag and infuses the idea of a ―nation‖, by inviting people of varied ethnicities
and background in the nation-building process by providing jobs and securing their
rights and engaging them in infrastructure development.



A centralized state adds legitimacy to the government by serving as a tool for
international diplomacy.



A centralized state serves as a responsible medium for the implementation of
development policies and practices in the country, through taking responsibility of
and utilizing foreign aid, and by ensuring accountability and transparency.



A centralized government strengthens the national security forces by providing
uniformity in their structure and functioning and by illegitimatizing other nongovernmental, self-operating armed groups.



A centralized government ties all lower level governing authorities together, by
serving as a powerful inspector and demanding them to report all their activities,
ensuring that the local people are served well and that lower-level corruption is
reduced.

Some of the advantages outlined above also create a platform for many disadvantages that
the centralized government has on a country like Afghanistan. Some of them are:
 A centralized government comprised of members of former, ousted government, as it
appears to be the case with Afghanistan, can become of symbol of ‗impunity from
violence‘ and can lose the trust of the people who sacrificed their lives to change the
country‘s leadership.
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A centralized government comprised of leaders who are less aware and educated of
the country‘s intricate complexities, but highly backed up by the international
community can also make it a victim of public discontent and rejection.

 A centralized government cannot expand its influence far from its physical operating
location (in this case Kabul) and thus fails to secure and develop the entire country
uniformly. This failure means that the country is never able to fully secure itself as
terrorist groups merely shift their power hold from Kabul to a different district of the
country. Development in one region (close to the capital) also comes at the expense of
another (far from the capital).
 A central government, if corrupt (as is the case in Afghanistan), reduces the
possibility of effective foreign aid utilization and multi-dimensional development.
 Proportionate representation is almost impossible in a centralized government with
local resources, manpower and participation being neglected.
 The possibility of power sharing with sub-national authorities is reduced, thus
increasing the work load of the central government which ends up having to deal with
bigger issues like terrorism and smaller issues like petty thieves at the same time.

2. Effort at sub-national level:
Now since we have talked about both positive and negative values of a centralized
government, the question of capacity building moves from the central government to subnational and local level. What is the current status and future value of local capacity
development and what does it actually mean? The government of Afghanistan has realized the
necessity of a balance between rigid centralism and moderate decentralization, encouraging
provincial and district-level administrations to improve their management systems and
31

providing them with more financial autonomy.74 Sub-national governance is very important
for it deals with the local population from much closer than the central government. A UNDP
report on capacity development remarks that a local development agenda is a tangible
foundation for reconstruction and participatory decision-making for the population at large.75
This makes a lot of sense in the context where the international community is slowly losing its
interest in Afghanistan, because of other larger economic problems and lack of public support
in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, et cetera. So, it is important to
develop the capacity of the Afghan population and the country‘s sub-national administration.
This approach has been expected to bring strong positive catalytic effects on participatory
resource allocation and economic revival at sub-national levels.76 The establishment of
Community Development Councils (CDC) in huge numbers in Afghanistan has been a
positive step towards decentralization. The idea has been accentuated through Afghanistan
Compact where the Afghan government has pledged to give priority to establishment of
functional institutions at the provincial level.77 The sub-national consultation process of the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) also facilitated a dialogue between the
central government and the provinces, leading to the formation of many village-based and
district-based development plans.78
However, the transition period is a time when many complex social, political and
economic issues come together, thus making sub-national state-building difficult. Hamish
Nixon, an expert on sub-national state-building in Afghanistan, asserts that the two things
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currently complicating the expansion of sub-national state-building in Afghanistan are: i.
limited state capacity and low degree of penetration to local levels; and ii. a considerable
desire on the part of both the government and citizenry for strong centralization due to the
fear of fragmentation of the country.79 Lyall brings up the same issue saying the participants
of the First Bonn Conference ―overestimated the danger of ethnic civil war and so created a
hyper-centralized executive office, which actually made ethnic conflict more, rather than less,
likely.‖80 However, without decentralizing the government to some extent, it is impossible to
ensure a smooth flow of services to the community.
Nixon further reports that sub-national state-building in Afghanistan has been
characterized by a lack of sub-national governance policy.81 It is important for the
government not just to establish sub-national committees but also to define their functions,
allocate resources to them, and establish provisions to ensure accountability. One major
hindrance is, undoubtedly, the government‘s inability to ensure security. The effect of
continuous violence in Afghan societies has been to displace a large number of people to
nearby Pakistan and other countries—a clear indicator of declining manpower or human
capacity in Afghan societies. Illiteracy, poverty and the social structure that encourage only
males to work add more impediments to the pre-existing low capacity of the society. This
lack of state-capacity to ensure security—or to fight insurgency—and its effect on subnational capacity development displays the interdependence nature of all the various actors
and variables.
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IV. Impact of the Transition Period on Afghanistan’s Economic
Development Prospects
Economic development doesn‘t exist independent of political and social development.
The variables that we discussed and analyzed above show direct political impact, but what
makes them dangerous in the Afghan context is their impact on the economy. Economic
development is measured by sophisticated means, such as GDP, imports and exports, overall
budget, exchange rates, et cetera, which are not very familiar to the local public. This
unfamiliarity makes economics a less discussed issue in the public domain; however, its
impact is ubiquitous, ranging from the fulfillment of the basic needs of the community to the
financing of the large development projects. Amidst crises of legitimacy, corruption, lack of
national and sub-national capacity, and insecurity during the transition period, Afghanistan
has suffered economically too.
Although slight progresses have been made throughout the transition period in
rebuilding the country‘s economy, the changes are not groundbreaking. The progress is
neither uniform nor commensurate with the total effort applied so far. According to the IMF,
the most pressing economic tasks of transition-period Afghanistan involved restoring
economic stability and rebuilding institutions in an unstable security situation.82 The major
concern of security has had a direct impact on private investment. Another major problem for
Afghanistan‘s economic growth has been corruption. However, with foreign troops returning
back home and the Afghan government getting more control over its political and economic
policy-making, the main hindrance for Afghanistan‘s economic growth not only remains
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corruption, but also the inability of the government to institute effective policies to secure and
maximize foreign aid, including a failure to create long-term community-driven projects.
Security is a big issue impacting economic development in Afghanistan. The presence
of the highly effective ISAF forces have greatly aided the business environment. However,
their continuous withdrawal means that challenges are growing and that economic
development is at peril again. A World Bank report suggested that ―Afghanistan will need an
open-ended commitment from foreign donors of at least $7 billion a year, much of which will
probably have to be spent on security unless the insurgency has weakened by 2014.‖83 The
withdrawal of international military forces also means the possibility of withdrawal of many
international organizations that are currently operating in Afghanistan, for security reasons.
International organizations‘ presence would not only complement the government‘s request
for foreign aid but would also provide an assessment of progress in various fields through
research and analysis. However, with the possibility of their recall, this seems impossible.
After the formation of Karzai-led democratic government, opium cultivation has
surged in the country and has become an important economic activity. The Taliban regime
before 2001 had banned opium production and destroyed the crop around the country on the
belief that Islam does not allow cultivation and use of drugs. However, during the transition
period, the Taliban insurgents themselves got involved in opium production, justifying their
action as an effort to assist the fight against the Western coalition. As a result, Afghanistan is
now the world‘s largest producer and exporter of opium. According to an IMF report,
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Afghanistan supplies 85% of the world‘s heroin and morphine.84 It is clear that opium
production is an important economic activity of the transition period and at the same time is
part of the illegitimate economy of the country that involves local farmers, Taliban insurgents
and many governmental officials. However, opium farming has helped to improve the living
conditions of many farmers in the country as they sell for a very high price. A UNODC report
indicates that the per-hectare income of opium cultivation is US$ 10,700.85 Revenues from
this cultivation provide the basic necessities of food, shelter and an increasing income-level.
However, the downside of opium farming is that it also has financed terrorist activities,
smuggling and corruption. It has helped strengthen terrorist insurgents and at the same time
facilitated corruption at the administrative level. It is interesting to observe that opium
cultivation is highest in the regions that are categorized as high or extremely risky by the
United Nations Department of Safety and Security.86 By the report of UNODC, 78 per cent of
opium cultivation is done in those risky zones.87 We see that the lack of state capacity to
encourage legitimate economic activities, cut down on corruption and increase counterinsurgency efforts has stimulated opium production, which has ultimately led to the economic
instability of the country.
The primary goal of Afghanistan is to be economically self-sustaining. This is an unlikely
possibility in the light of all the foreign aid that flows into the country. However the aim is not
to cut off all the foreign aid, but to create effective means to put it into sustainable use. Thus,
one of the commitments of the Bonn Conference II has been to increase aid effectiveness to
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attain a sustainable market economy in line with the social needs of the population.88 Aid
effectiveness relies heavily on the growth of private investment and financial institutions in
the country, which as mentioned above is at jeopardy due to security issues. Aid that comes as
grants harms the country‘s economic potential the most by limiting the government‘s ability
to collect revenue through taxation and through involvement in international trade. An IMF
report indicates that the overall current account deficit was financed almost entirely through
grants, raising concerns of medium-term sustainability.89
The impact of the transition period on economic development can be rephrased to
explain the impact of the variables described earlier (lack of legitimacy, corruption, lack of
capacity) on economic development (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Elements absolutely necessary for economic development
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Through our study and analysis of these variables we can summarize their impacts on
economic development as follows:
A. Legitimacy and Economic Development:
 A government alleged as illegitimate is also perceived as an untrustworthy receiver of
foreign aid—the largest source of Afghanistan‘s revenue.
 Most of the foreign aid that comes to the country is not channeled through the
government. This ―external budgeting‖ 90 makes it difficult for the government to
execute economic development policies and decreases its aid utilization capacity in the
long-run.
 Lack of legitimacy, derived by the government‘s highly centralized presence, means
that economic development is capital-centered.
 A legitimate government can be effective in generating revenue through taxation as
people and businesses find it logical to pay taxes only if they trust that their payment
will come back to them in the form of developed infrastructure.
 Nixon mentions that high aid dependency is supposed to compromise state
sovereignty, thus reducing the government‘s legitimacy in the eyes of the population.91
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B. Corruption and Economic Development:
 Corruption drains aid into the pockets of individuals thus making it impossible to
invest in any areas—whether it be security, or economic reform.
 Corruption aids the drug-based economy, which being an underground industry clouds
the figures on legal economic activity92 and also hampers the production of other
sustainable and export-oriented agricultural products.
 Aid in Afghanistan has mostly been supply driven.93 This can be seen as an indirect
cause to corruption since supply-driven aid relieves the receiver from the necessity to
expend effort94 or be accountable.

C. Lack of Capacity and Economic Development:
 Lack of agricultural capacity—irrigation, machineries, fertilizers, property rights, land
reform—means low agricultural output.
 Higher import over export has caused a consistent trade deficit in Afghanistan.95
However in the past years this deficit had been covered by foreign aid. But the
increasing lack of capacity to utilize foreign aid means that if export-oriented policies
and reforms are not planned and executed then the deficit might enlarge in near future.
 Lack of institutional capacity is inversely proportional to a country‘s claim for debtrelief. This is because lack of capacity leads to low levels of output, below the
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demands of the donors. However, in the past years, Afghanistan has been able to
achieve debt-relief.96
 Lack of capacity to counter insurgencies means low level of security, which directly
affects the level of private investment.
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V. Tying Everything Together
A. Division of function
The stabilization of a state with a long history of conflict is possible only if all the
local, sub-national, national and international actors work cooperatively in all the areas—
social, political and economic. The problems arising from the complexities of the Afghan
transition period cannot be totally eliminated, but can be minimized if a simple formula of
division of labor or role identification is applied. Afghanistan requires a balanced approach by
these actors, and the role of the government is very significant in creating this balance. 97 The
diagram below (Figure 2) provides a simple model of this division of labor idea.
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Figure 2. The balanced interplay of various actors
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In an ideal situation, the government, by virtue of its legitimacy, accountability and
transparency, receives aid from the international community. The aid is utilized by the
government to strengthen national security forces and to fund sub-national administration,
assigning them the responsibility to provide services to the local community. Security is
provided by the central government itself, so that uniformity is maintained in the national
security forces‘ activities and so that the government has leverage over other armed groups in
the country. The sub-national administration, on the other hand, utilizes the funds distributed
by the government to provide basic services like education, health, awareness, security from
small social problems, agricultural infrastructures, incentives to initiate community-led
development, encouragement in establishing new businesses and continuing old, et cetera.
The sub-national level will face the necessity to accurately report its work to the
government—thus checking their corruption too—which then makes reports to the donors.
The sub-national level is also provided with capacity development training directly from the
international community and NGOs, who have experience in such areas partly because of
their involvement in other countries and partly because of their understanding of the Afghan
community in the last decade. This approach attempts to create a balance between the
functions of the actors who aim to serve the local community. However, one cannot disregard
the fact that there are various scenarios where functions overlap, for example when the
international community deals directly with the local community or when the sub-national
and national authorities have a tussle over their jurisdiction. The idea is not to totally avoid
these overlapping areas. The government has to do thorough research on the complexities and
devise a workable formula assigning specific functions to different levels, so that the work is
made easy.

B. Strengthening political legitimacy
The government is able to divide these functions (mentioned above) properly only by
strengthening its legitimacy. The development of Afghanistan lies in the hands of Afghan
people and initiatives have to come from within. A legitimate government is one that is ready
to take the lead of the state and lead it towards self-sustainability. A legitimate government
can also lead the approach for ―participatory development‖ by strengthening the capacity of
its administration and framing this approach in the national plan for development.98 The
overall progress of the state revolves around legitimacy and conversely, legitimacy is
strengthened by the progress in these various areas.
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Figure 3. Legitimacy, an important variable that connects all other variables together
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As mentioned earlier, because of the significance of various actors, the government
needs to strengthen its legitimacy at all levels—international, sub-national and local. By
utilizing foreign aid with accountability, by aiding the international effort of creating a
terrorist-free world, and by strengthening the values of human rights and democratic
governance, the government can strengthen its international legitimacy. By distributing funds
at the sub-national level to facilitate service delivery, by avoiding nepotism by allowing
heterogeneity in the administration and by checking on corruption within its administration,
the government can strengthen its sub-national legitimacy. By providing people with basic
needs, by securing the people from terrorist‘s atrocities and negligence of their own
administration, and by successfully completing the various reconstruction and development
projects that raise the living standard of the people, the government can strengthen its local
legitimacy.
The complexity of Afghan situation is that political and economic challenges are
interrelated and change in one area is possible only through a parallel change in the other.
Legitimacy of the government depends on its ability to develop state capacity and formulate
sustainable economic policies. Conversely, development of state capacity and economic
progress is possible only if the government is seen as legitimate by its people and by the
international community.
C. Transition to Transformation
After a decade of foreign military assistance and huge publicity in the international
arena, Afghanistan has increased its involvement in international diplomacy. Its participation
in international affairs is growing. By leading the Bonn Conference II in Germany,
Afghanistan not only showed its eagerness to correct the misconception about the country‘s

overall status but also gave a glimpse of its developing capacity.99 Afghanistan also claimed
that the transition period is approaching its end and named the period of 2015-2024 as
Transformation Decade.100 It has shown a few positive changes in the overall economic
situation of the country since the end of the Taliban regime. The per capita GDP of the
country has risen from about US$150- US$180 in 2002101 to around US$530 in 2010/2011.102
The IMF considers this improvement a signal that the economy has been robust with real
GDP growth averaging more than 10 percent annually over the past five years (8 percent in
2010/11), and inflation moderating.103 One of the major achievements has been the
implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). 104 Progress has
also been made in the area of government‘s revenue collection, showing an increase of
collection to 11 percent of GDP in 2010/11 from less than 7 percent in 2005/06.105
Afghanistan‘s recent entry into SAARC, a regional group of South Asian countries,
has opened doors for the development of the trade sector, raising its prospects for benefit
through the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Afghanistan joined SAARC on April 3,
2007.106 As a result of this inclusion, Afghanistan is now able to enjoy concessions and
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reductions of tariffs when trading with other contracting states. 107 Afghanistan‘s membership
in SAARC means that it will be able to work closely with one of the rising economic powers
of the world, India. Pakistan‘s presence in SAARC will, on the other hand, help address
security concerns in a cooperative regional level. Afghanistan‘s energy resources also provide
great trade prospects as well as its capacity to serve as an important link between South Asia
and Central Asia.108 New trade prospects will also encourage the Afghan population to shift
from drug-based agriculture to the production of legitimate crops and products.
To move from transition to transformation Afghanistan definitely has to pay special
attention to all the variables we have discussed earlier. However, it should also focus in
making itself self-sustainable and look for new opportunities beyond the aid from the Western
world.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the literature to establish the interconnectedness among
various variables that play important roles in the political and economic transition of a state.
In the case of Afghanistan, their role and interplay was profound, clearly shaping the
country‘s present and probably its future. The variables included: legitimacy, corruption and
state capacity. We found out that since Operation Enduring Freedom or perhaps a little before
that, Afghanistan‘s government has lost its legitimacy within the country and outside, and
thus it has become politically and economically vulnerable. Corruption levels in the country
have remained high, and are even increasing despite the existing anti-corruption policies.
While discussing state capacity, we found it important to analyze the differences between a
centralized state and a decentralized state, and there implications in the case of Afghanistan.
Although a centralized form would strengthen legitimacy in some ways in the international
community, a decentralized form was found to be very important to gain public legitimacy
and pave the path for long-term sustainable development. This finding, combined with the
current centralized government‘s lack of reach and capacity, led us to the understanding that
sub-national state capacity should be strengthened in Afghanistan and that stabilization would
be possible only if there is a balance between the national and the sub-national level. The
overlapping areas between legitimacy, corruption and capacity were profound in their impact
on the economic development prospect of the country and the role of legitimacy was
especially important in the case of Afghanistan, since it lies in the hands of the government to
lead the country after the withdrawal of foreign troops and the reduction in international aid.
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